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Article 
Mission Impossible: A Legislative Solution for 
Excessive Executive Compensation 
ROBERT E. WAGNER  
One of the great dilemmas of corporate law is how to address the 
problem of excessive executive compensation without replacing it with 
excessive government intervention.  This Article proposes for the first time 
that Article 36(b) of the Investment Company Act (“ICA”), which enacted 
fiduciary obligations for investment advisers, be applied to general public 
corporations.  The effect of this proposal—termed Corporate 36(b)—would 
be to impose upon CEOs and other highly placed corporate executives a 
fiduciary duty with regard to their compensation packages.  This would 
enable federal courts to genuinely evaluate the procedural and substantive 
nature of executive compensation negotiations.  As scholars, the media, 
and politicians have pointed out, excessive executive compensation 
reduces shareholder wealth, increases hostility in the workplace, and 
provokes societal anger.  The Article demonstrates that the legislative 
history of the ICA supports the application of its principles to general 
corporations.  It further shows that the courts’ implementation of the ICA 
can be replicated in the context of general corporations.  The Article 
argues that adoption of Corporate 36(b) will help to reduce executive 
demands, to empower and incentivize boards of directors, and to avoid 
undesirable federal regulation.  The Article also addresses potential 
criticisms concerning the risk of nuisance suits and strike litigation, the 
vagaries of involving courts in business decisions, and the problems 
surrounding federalization of corporate law.  The Article concludes with a 
brief description of how the proposed legislation could have been applied 
to deal with the controversial compensation package in the well-known 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the death of Apple icon Steve Jobs, Tim Cook took the reins of 
the company and likely became the highest-paid CEO in America in 2011.
1
  
The Associated Press reported that Cook’s compensation package was 
valued at $378 million.
2
  At approximately the same time, the median 
salary for American workers had just fallen to a decade low of $26,364 a 
year.
3
  Given this extreme disparity, there is little mystery as to why 
movements like “Occupy Wall Street” have received so much attention 
over the last year.
4
  Many people, including leading scholars and seemingly 
almost the entire nation, think that executive compensation in publicly 
owned American companies is excessive.
5
  In 2010, CEOs at a majority of 
the S&P 500 companies had an average salary equaling 343 times that of 
an average American worker.
6
  Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) Chairman William Donaldson has stated: “One of the great, as-
yet-unresolved problems in the country today is executive compensation 
and how it is determined.”7  The news is commonly filled with stories of 
                                                                                                                          
 Visiting Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark; University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business, M.B.A.; Cornell Law School, J.D.  I would like to thank Adil Haque, Jacqueline 
Lipton, Irina Manta, Chrystin Ondersma, Cassandra Robertson, Reid Weisbord, and my research 
assistant Jordan Kaplan.  I am grateful to the staff of the Rutgers School of Law-Newark for support 
during my research. 
1 Ryan Nakashima, Apple CEO Tim Cook Could Top Pay List in 2011, YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 
10, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/apple-ceo-tim-cook-could-003124192.html. 
2 Id.  The Article notes that this was a large change for Apple, where in the past, former Apple 
CEO Steve Jobs accepted a salary of only one dollar for several years but owned approximately 5.5 
million shares in the company, worth about $2.3 billion as of January 2012.  Id. 
3 David Cay Johnston, First Look at US Pay Data, It’s Awful, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2011, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/19/idUS254294359320111019. 
4 Id. (“The data show why protests like Occupy Wall Street have so quickly gained momentum 
around the country, as people who cannot find work try to focus the federal government on creating 
jobs . . . .”).  
5 Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done 
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013–14 (2009). 
6 Jennifer Liberto, CEOs Earn 343 Times More than Typical Workers, CNNMONEY (Apr. 20, 
2011, 7:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/ceo_pay/index.htm.  
7 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189 (2004). 
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executive compensation.
8
  We are repeatedly encountering stories of 
executives prospering while the corporation they head and its employees 
are struggling, and we often hear instances of lavish perks given to CEOs 
even after they leave their jobs.
9
  Last year, in the New York Times alone, 
there were 268 articles dealing with executive compensation
10
 and over 
10,000 articles appeared in publications across the nation.
11
  While the 
financial crisis that began in September 2008 cannot be blamed solely on 
executive compensation, it is related at least indirectly;
12
 indeed, executive 
compensation has been described as a “contributing factor” to the recent 
economic crisis by the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner.
13
  This 
Article attempts to address the problem of excessive executive 
compensation by proposing the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
executives in matters dealing with executive compensation. 
Many people are concerned about the seeming unfairness of 
disproportionate executive compensation and promote the idea of 
governmental regulation to limit these perceived excesses.
14
  In times of 
economic difficulty or scandal, even conservative politicians embrace 
increased government control of corporations, and after the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, President Bush praised the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
containing “the most far reaching reforms of American business practices 
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”15  Politicians feel a strong 
need to appear to upset investors that they are “doing something” and 
being “aggressive” against possible corporate fraud.16  Furthermore, in the 
2008 presidential election, candidates repeatedly used executive 
compensation as an issue that signified social inequities and required a 
                                                                                                                          
8 Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s Efforts to Regulate 
Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 484 (2007). 
9 See id. at 485 (describing how ConAgra Foods employees are seeing their bonuses eliminated 
while the former Chairman received bonuses, stock options, and a $20 million retirement package, and 
how General Electric CEO’s retirement package included a New York City apartment, country club 
memberships, use of the corporate jet, and Red Sox tickets).  
10 This resulted from a Westlaw search of the New York Times database using the search terms 
“ceo or executive w/5 pay or compensation” for the dates between 12/31/2010 and 1/1/2012. 
11 This resulted from a Westlaw search of the “ALLNEWS” database using the search terms “ceo 
or executive w/5 pay or compensation” for the dates between 12/31/2010 and 1/1/2012. 
12 Posner, supra note 5, at 1040–41.   
13 Joe Nocera, Geithner’s Plan on Pay Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at B1. 
14 See James O’Toole, Occupy Wall Street Reacts to Goldman Sachs Pay, CNNMONEY (Oct. 20, 
2011, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/goldman_sachs_occupy_wall_street
/index.htm (relating statements by Amanda Saleen, Stephen Crawn, and Gabriel 
Brownsteinindividuals who participated in Occupy Wall Streetwhen asked about Goldman Sachs 
setting aside $10 billion for staff pay, including, “I think it’s ridiculous” and “for the future of our 
nation there needs to be a change,” and calling for “more strict regulation” of the financial industry). 
15 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 
2003, at 26, 28.  
16 Id. at 28. 
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regulatory solution.
17
  It was also an issue in the 1992 presidential 
campaign,
18
 and there is no reason to believe that the current election cycle 
will be any different.  There is a history of major economic government 
interventions during times of crisis, including in matters of securities 
trading during the Great Depression, corporate takeovers in the 1980s, and 
corporate governance following the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
19
 
In a poll performed by Fortune magazine in 1936, most Americans 
already thought that executives were paid too much.
20
  Well before the 
current economic crisis, contemporary executive compensation had been 
criticized by scholars and the populace alike for decades.
21
  As pointed out 
recently by the Obama Administration’s so-called “pay czar” (appointed to 
determine appropriate compensation levels for Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (“TARP”) recipients),22 high levels of uncertainty and 
unemployment combined with low job security induce society at large to 
experience anger when finding out about the high salaries that executives 
receive.
23
  This frustration will most likely eventually translate into 
government action. 
Some politicians and others have claimed for several decades that the 
problem with executive compensation is that executives are accountable to 
directors whom they select themselves, rather than to the shareholders 
directly.
24
  Yet, surprisingly very little has been done to give shareholders 
the ability to make executives accountable to them.  Over time, much of 
the thought about executive compensation was based on economic 
assumptions that may be flawed.  As Judge Posner from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in a recent dissent, this “economic 
analysis . . . is ripe for reexamination on the basis of growing indications 
that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is 
excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police 
compensation.”25 
                                                                                                                          
17 Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive 
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 305 (2009). 
18 Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—Again, 41 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 147, 148 (2006). 
19 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591 (2003). 
20 Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, 
Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 858 (2011).  
21 See Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive 
Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1995) 
(stating that the issue of excessive compensation is not new). 
22 Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, (June 5, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416737421887739.html. 
23 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Symposium on Executive Compensation Keynote Address, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 349, 351 (2011).  
24 Salky, supra note 21, at 800. 
25 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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The basic problem is one of agency costs, which arise in situations in 
which an agent is hired to do a job that the principal is either unable or 
unwilling to do; while the principal wants the agent to do the best job that 
he can, he also wants to pay him as little as possible.
26
  The principal wants 
his own and the agent’s interests to coincide, but because the agent is 
looking out for himself just as the principal is, the only way to ensure that 
the agent will be perfectly faithful to him is if he thoroughly monitors and 
gauges the agent’s work and correspondingly adjusts the agent’s 
payment.
27
  Otherwise the agent is likely to “slack off, or divert revenues to 
himself, or both.”28  In this context, the task of a board of directors is to 
conduct that monitoring, but some individuals have begun to question 
whether boards of directors are controlled by long-term CEOs and are 
therefore not supplying the necessary oversight.
29
  In support of this, they 
point out that CEOs are not fired that frequently; in fact, only between two-
percent to two-and-one-quarter-percent of CEOs at large corporations are 
forced out each year,
30
 a rate that some think is lower than warranted and 
that further indicates CEOs’ control over boards. 
Given the recurring nature of executive compensation questions, 
scholars have claimed that “any regulatory regime that can somehow grant 
shareholders more power over compensation decisions . . . is a positive 
step toward improving the inherent problems with existing compensation 
practices.”31  Executive compensation has been soaring for decades despite 
various attempts to stop that trend, ranging from the imposition of 
increased tax burdens to mandatory disclosure requirements.
32
  In fact, the 
federal government is already exercising more control than ever over the 
relationship between boards and executives, and further regulations are 
likely, including possible ones requiring specific amounts of 
compensation.
33
  There has already been some federal regulation of 
executive compensation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act,
34
 which requires that 
if a corporation engages in erroneous reporting that results in it later having 
to correct its financial statements, then the corporation must have policies 
                                                                                                                          
26 Posner, supra note 5, at 1015. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.   
29 See Charles K. Whitehead, Why Not a CEO Term Limit?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1263, 1271–73 
(2011) (arguing that one of the board’s functions is to oversee the CEO, but the CEO actually exercises 
control over the board). 
30 Id. at 1267. 
31 Salky, supra note 21, at 826. 
32 See Simmons, supra note 17, at 304 (describing various responses that have failed to address 
increasing executive compensation including tax measures, board independence requirements, and 
mandated disclosures). 
33 See Whitehead, supra note 29, at 1276–77 (describing regulatory control over corporate 
governance and noting that “future proposals may include . . . implementing a range of CEO pay 
requirements that mandate certain types of compensation.”). 
34 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301 (West 2010). 
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that enable it to claw back incentive-based pay from executives.
35
  Indeed, 
there are already many different types of federal and quasi-federal 
organizations that affect the internal structure of corporations, such as 
Congress itself and agencies like the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and 
the SEC, but also quasi-private institutions like the New York Stock 
Exchange and others.
36
   
Unfortunately, lawmakers have a tendency to go into “crisis-mode” 
and have “knee-jerk” regulatory reform responses in times of economic 
turmoil.
37
  As a result, many of the previous remedies to executive 
compensation, such as increased disclosure, which seemed to be 
“uncontroversial,”38 not only failed to reduce compensation but arguably 
increased it.
39
  American CEOs are paid, on average, over twice as much as 
foreign CEOs, which is at least in part due to the fact that a much larger 
percentage of their pay is in the form of stock options;
40
 this latter state of 
affairs arguably resulted from attempting to tie their pay to performance as 
the tax law encouraged.
41
  As Professor Richard A. Epstein has pointed 
out, there are always conflicts of interests between the firm’s welfare and 
an executive’s welfare, and there are downsides to every compensation 
package, which is why he argues that “regulation is such a foolhardy way 
to approach the problem.”42  
Not only have regulatory attempts to address executive compensation 
created problems, but the courts have not provided workable solutions, 
either. Traditionally, shareholders have had three options if they were 
dissatisfied with the corporation of which they owned a part: selling, 
voting, or suing.
43
  Studies have shown that, while not impossible, it is very 
difficult for shareholders in public companies to have much success in 
                                                                                                                          
35 Whitehead, supra note 29, at 1276. 
36 Simmons, supra note 17, at 323. 
37 Id. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO 
Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 461–62 (2007). 
39 This increase is apparent (1) in the “ratcheting effects” that are exacerbated by disclosure and 
(2) in the increased grants to CEOs of stock options, which is caused partly by the tax changes reducing 
deductions for pay not linked to “performance.”  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 71–72 
(stating that the vast majority of firms using peer-group information set CEO compensation at or above 
the fiftieth percentile of the peer group, leading to an increase in compensation); Simmons, supra note 
17, at 346 (explaining that a tax law with the express purpose of containing executive compensation has 
resulted in an escalation of pay through stock options).  
40 Posner, supra note 5, at 1020–21. 
41 Simmons, supra note 17, at 346. 
42 Richard A. Epstein, Steering Clear of the Executive Compensation Bog, FORBES, June 16, 
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/15/salary-bonus-ceo-opinions-columnists-executive-
compensation.html. 
43 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise 
in Futility, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 569–70 (2001). 
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compensation lawsuits,
44
 with the condition of demand futility
45
 imposing 
a particularly high burden in these cases.
46
  In the first pertinent case 
decided by the Supreme Court, a somewhat shareholder-friendly rule 
seemed to be emerging.  The rule was that “[i]f a bonus payment has no 
relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in 
part and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate 
property against the protest of the minority.”47  Yet, this seemingly 
shareholder-friendly approach by the judiciary was short-lived.  Courts are 
usually reluctant to become involved in corporate executive compensation 
issues.
48
  Many reasons exist for limited judicial intervention on internal 
corporate affairs, including the common belief that judges are unable to 
determine appropriate compensation packages, the minimal amount of 




One of the problems with attempting to deal with high executive 
compensation is the fact that not everybody agrees that it is a problem at 
all.  Just because executive compensation is high does not necessarily 
mean it is excessive.  It could only be accurately described as excessive if 
it is above the “correct” price, and determining said price is very difficult.50  
There are at least two schools of thought regarding executive 
compensation.  One could be classified as the adherents of the “optimal 
contract” theory, who basically assert that there is nothing wrong with the 
current situation and that modification is unnecessary; juxtaposed with the 
managerial power theorists, who advocate “sweeping changes to the 
current system.”51  The latter argue that a CEO’s only supervisor is the 
board of directors, which may be an unreliable agent of the principals (the 
shareholders) themselves.
52
  Some empirical studies have concluded that 
CEOs do in fact have significant bargaining power, and the differences 
between their contracts and those of other corporate workers “seem quite 
                                                                                                                          
44 See id. at 571. 
45 See infra note 161 and supporting text.  
46 Thomas & Martin, supra note 43, at 571.  
47 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–92 (1933) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks 
omitted). 
48 But see Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 848 (explaining that “contrary to received wisdom, 
courts have from time to time engaged in serious review of executive compensation practices and pay 
packages”). 
49 Thomas & Martin, supra note 43, at 572.  
50 Hawkins, supra note 38, at 450; see also D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, 
Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 874 (2007) (stating that extraordinarily 
generous compensation packages are not necessarily excessive). 
51 Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 847–48. 
52 Posner, supra note 5, at 1018. 
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stark.”53 
It is a fairly common belief that the discretionary power of both 
directors and executives in a corporation should be directed toward a single 
end, “the maximization of shareholder wealth,”54 but how to achieve that 
goal is less clear.  Many agree that placing a cap on CEO compensation 
would be a mistake.
55
  Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox noted in a 
speech in 2006 that it is not the government’s role to determine the 
appropriate level of executive compensation; rather, it is the shareholders’ 
and directors’ job “to determine how best to align executive compensation 
with corporation performance, to determine the appropriate levels of 
executive pay, and to decide on the metrics for determining it.”56 As Judge 
Posner has indicated, “The more effective shareholder monitoring is, the 
less need there is for incentive-based compensation: the stick is substituted 
for the carrot.”57  At the same time, the more complex the tasks are, the 
higher the cost of monitoring.
58
  This Article will delineate a proposal that 
reduces these costs by not only increasing the amount of available outside 
monitoring but also decreasing the total amount of monitoring needed. 
I suggest that the legislature should adopt Section 36(b) of the ICA, 
which imposes a fiduciary duty upon investment advisors and investment 
companies in relation to advisors’ compensation,59 and should apply it to 
CEOs and publicly traded corporations when it comes to CEOs’ and other 
executives’ salaries.  I call my idea “Corporate 36(b)” and will refer to it as 
such in this Article.  Corporate 36(b) would subject the compensation 
packages of CEOs and other highly placed executives to federal litigation 
in the event of egregiously inflated salaries.  Adopting a provision that 
contains numerous protections for all the parties, and that has received 
judicial approval from numerous appellate courts, including most recently 
the Supreme Court, will avoid the pitfalls of many other proposals.  
I will begin by describing the argument that executive compensation 
has been set at artificially high levels for many years (if not for decades 
and beyond), and I will focus on the case that Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Fried famously made in their book Pay Without Performance: The 
                                                                                                                          
53 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 266 (2006). 
54 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616 
(2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)). 
55 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 1045 (“Placing a ceiling on CEO salaries and other 
compensation would be a mistake.”). 
56 Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Chairman’s Opening Statement; 
Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm. 
57 Posner, supra note 5, at 1023.  
58 Id. at 1017. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
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Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
60
  which has been cited by 
over 300 law review articles and cases.
61
  I will then discuss the counter-
arguments presented against their thesis and conclude that whether or not 
one fully agrees with Bebchuk and Fried, virtually all observers 
acknowledge that problems—albeit of varying degrees—exist in the status 
quo.  I will then discuss the problems with the remedial measures 
attempted up to this point, including the failed efforts to correct the 
situation through tax reform, disclosure requirements, and shareholder 
litigation.  I will then present the argument for adopting Corporate 36(b) as 
a partial solution to the problems previously identified, and lastly, I will 
respond to possible objections to the proposal, including the possibility of 
strike suits and the issue of federalizing a part of corporate law.     
II.  MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS VERSUS OPTIMAL CONTRACT THEORY:  
BEBCHUK AND FRIED’S “PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE” AND ITS CRITICS 
A.  The Argument that Executive Compensation Is Broken 
In 2004, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried published a book that 
became the basis for many commentaries and criticisms of the corporate 
compensation structure; this book will serve as a foundation for my 
examination of the potential problems that currently exist with executive 
compensation.  As Bebchuk and Fried indicated, a surge of corporate 
scandals in 2001 led many individuals to examine and question how 
executive compensation is determined in U.S. corporations.
62
  They 
concluded that due to the flaws of the compensation system, it was 
necessary to make boards not only more independent from executives, but 
also more dependent on shareholders.
63
  They argued that the market 
constraints that are supposed to make boards and executives bargain over 
the executives’ compensation package in an arm’s-length manner are 
insufficient.
64
  Empirical studies show that executives with more power 
receive better packages that are less sensitive to performance than do 
similar but weaker executives.
65
 
Bebchuk and Fried denied the claim that receiving these large pay 
packages is inherently unfair; rather, they explained that their opposition 
comes from a purely pragmatic and consequentialist perspective.
66
  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                          
60 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7. 
61 This information results from a Westlaw search of the “ALLCASES, TP-ALL, JLR” data set 
using “pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation.” 
62 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at ix. 
63 Id. at x. 
64 Id. at 4. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. at 8. 
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there are several deleterious effects that can arise from excessive salaries, 
including smaller dividends for shareholders, a reduction of earnings per 
share, inefficiencies within the workplace that result in a negative impact 
on worker morale, higher turnover, and increased competitiveness among 
workers.
67
  The authors disagreed with the traditional view that “boards, 
bargaining at arm’s length with CEOs, negotiate pay arrangements 
designed to serve shareholders’ interests.”68  Rather, they pointed out that 
being a member of a board of directors has both financial and non-financial 
benefits that give strong incentives to board members to maintain their 
position.
69
  These incentives to keep their position are clearly affected by 
the fact that the most significant element of staying on a board is being 
placed on the company’s nomination slate, which is often controlled 
(sometimes even directly) by the CEO.
70
 
Bebchuk points to many incentives on the part of the board to give the 
CEO what she wants, including: (1) “[d]irectors are often CEOs of other 
companies and naturally think that CEOs should be well paid . . . often 
they are picked by the CEO”;71 (2) CEOs can influence the compensation 
given to directors;
72
 (3) many directors have social connections or are even 
friends with the CEO;
73
 (4) there is a desire to foster a collegial atmosphere 
because they will have an ongoing working relationship;
74
 and (5) a 
working pattern of respect and possibly acquiescence exists due to the 
CEO’s position.75  Even when supposedly external sources are used to 
determine compensation, problems persist.  For example, firms that 
specialize in consulting on these matters, “which provide cover for 
generous compensation packages voted by boards of directors, have a 
conflict of interest because they are paid not only for their compensation 
advice but for other services to the firm . . . for which they are hired by the 
officers whose compensation they advised on.”76  In 2005, one outside 
consultant, Hewitt Associates, worked for Verizon Communications and 
ultimately helped the compensation committee to arrive at a CEO 
compensation package worth $19.4 million, a forty-eight percent increase 
from the previous year.
77
  Unfortunately for Verizon, during the same time 
                                                                                                                          
67 Simmons, supra note 17, at 335. 
68 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 15. 
69 Id. at 25. 
70 Id. at 25–26. 
71 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
72 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 30–31. 
73 Id. at 31. 
74 Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 89, 108 (2007) 
(reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)). 
75 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 32. 
76 Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
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period, the value of company stock plummeted by twenty-six percent.
78
  To 
make matters worse, since 1997, this “outside” consultant had earned over 
half a billion dollars from consulting services provided to Verizon and 
reported to the CEO.
79
  This does not definitively show that the 
compensation package was inappropriate or that anything improper was 
done, but it does raise some questions.  On the other side of the scale, there 
are relatively few incentives for consultants to propose lower 
compensation, including a reduction in the value of any stock that the 
board may personally have and possible harm to the board’s reputation.80  
Bebchuk and Fried are not alone in this observation, as other scholars have 
pointed out that executive pay determinations seem to be very one-sided, 
with little weighing in on the side of shareholders.
81
 
Furthermore, litigation is a difficult road to travel for disgruntled 
shareholders.  Since any potential claims are concerned with harm to the 
corporation, shareholders have to file a derivative action.
82
 Generally, a 
demand upon the board must precede shareholder litigation, but this is 
problematic because boards can use the demand stage to take control and 
get lawsuits dismissed. Hence, to successfully file a derivative action, 
shareholders must circumvent this demand requirement by raising a 
reasonable doubt that the board was disinterested and independent.
83
  If the 
shareholders are able to overcome this large hurdle, the board may still 
appoint a special litigation committee comprised of independent directors 
that could recommend terminating the suit, and most courts will defer to 
this determination.
84
  If this hurdle is overcome, the shareholders will run 
into the business judgment rule, whose consequence is that a court will 
refuse to look at the substance of a board’s actions so long as procedural 
requirements are met.
85
  For executive compensation claims, these 
procedural requirements are essentially that the board be nominally 
independent and informed.
86
  If the rule applies, a court will not entertain 
arguments that the compensation package was unreasonable, and the only 
possible claim is that the alleged excessive compensation is corporate 
waste.
87
  To prove waste, a shareholder would have to show that the 
package is irrational to such an extent that no reasonable person could 
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approve it.
88
  This task is so nearly impossible and unlikely that it has been 
compared to the likelihood of seeing the Loch Ness Monster.
89
  Waste has 
even been described as a “vestige of discarded doctrines,” and 
commentators have urged that the doctrine be changed to “allow a majority 
shareholder vote to extinguish a waste claim.”90  
In addition to these hurdles, there seem to be many factors impacting 
CEO compensation that have very little, if anything, to do with 
maximizing shareholder wealth or any other measure of corporate benefit.  
For example, the compensation received by a CEO is significantly higher if 
the chair of the compensation committee was appointed after the CEO.
91
  
But even if we accept the proposition that executive compensation is out of 
alignment with the economic interests of corporations, the path to possible 
solutions is rocky.  Some have interpreted Bebchuk and Fried’s argument 
as stating that only “reducing takeover defenses, giving shareholders more 
power to change corporate rules, and opening up the nomination process to 
facilitate direct shareholder nomination of whole slates of directors” can 
begin to correct the flawed executive compensation system.
92
  
Nevertheless, Bebchuk and Fried themselves recognize the fact that 
because shareholders are in possession of limited information regarding the 
company and are better equipped to help guide the “general contours of 
compensation plans,” they should be limited in how much detailed input 
they can exercise.
93
  The scholars further claim that to address what they 
see as the problems with executive compensation, we need to “adopt[] 
reforms that would confront boards with a different set of incentives and 
constraints,”94 and that one way to limit the board’s discretion while still 
allowing it to make beneficial decisions would be to require that 
shareholders approve certain board decisions.
95
 
Bebchuk and Fried state that the widely dispersed ownership of many 
modern corporations, which results in the increased power of the board and 
insulation from the shareholders, is not inevitable, but rather “this power is 
partly due to the legal rules that insulate management from shareholder 
intervention.”96  Bebchuk and Fried further observe that “[c]hanging these 
rules would reduce the extent to which boards can stray from shareholder 
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interests and would much improve corporate governance.”97  Before 
addressing whether my proposal addresses these concerns, we should first 
consider the arguments of individuals who do not believe that the current 
system of executive compensation poses problems. 
B.  The Argument that Executive Compensation Is Efficient 
There are numerous scholars and professionals who disagree with 
Bebchuk and Fried’s managerial power thesis.98  Some have also pointed 
out that managerial power is more complicated than Bebchuk and Fried’s 
model may indicate in that it involves intricate social interactions in which 
the CEO utilizes informational advantages, “personal dynamism, 
exploitation of cognitive biases, social norms and fear of disruption of the 
status quo” to convince the board of his position.99  While acknowledging 
that Bebchuk and Fried have some valid points, other scholars have 
indicated that their theory leaves some questions unanswered.  For 
example, they question why boards are willing to fire poorly performing 
CEOs but are still under CEOs’ influence when it comes to pay, why  
increased disclosure has not resulted in decreased packages, why new 
CEOs get paid more than incumbent CEOs in similar companies,
100
 and 
how it is that salaries go up and down if the theory that managers dominate 
their boards is correct.
101
 
On the other side of Bebchuk and Fried’s model of failed corporate 
governance in the area of compensation is the position that executives are 
in fact paid high salaries appropriately for the great value of the services 
that they provide.
102
  Many practitioners and experts have claimed that 
while executives make large salaries, they are not unique in that other 
professionals like musicians, actors, athletes, venture capitalists, and 
investment bankers also receive very large salaries.
103
  Other commentators 
have stated that there is no problem with excessive compensation and that 
the high salaries are in fact warranted due to the size and complexity of 
some modern corporations.
104
  Furthermore, executives help to create jobs 
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and investment opportunities for the average investor.
105
  The contrary 
position to Bebchuk and Fried’s argument is that pay packages are very 
sensitive to corporate performance and that executives typically make 
more money when the corporation they run does well.
106
  Experts have also 
pointed out that managerial power theorists claim to be correct not only 
when citing to examples where executives prospered while their companies 
faltered, but also where executives were making large salaries and the 
companies were prospering.
107
  In the latter cases, these theorists either 
choose to ignore the success of the companies or acknowledge it but still 
argue that the large salaries result from managerial power.  Those who 
adhere to optimal contract theory, however, believe that if the corporation 
is prospering, then the executive is doing his job and his high salary is 
justified.  In the last ten to fifteen years, while it is true that CEO 
compensation has risen faster than inflation and average employee pay, 
“[i]t has not risen faster than the broad stock market and individual 
company share prices,”108 and “[s]ome economists believe that the way the 
United States pays its executives is a major source of competitive 
advantage and that we reject it at our peril.”109 
Further, commentators have argued that the salaries are appropriate 
notwithstanding their magnitude because the markets where CEOs are paid 
less have not performed as well as the U.S. markets.
110
  Such salaries also 
enable optimal management practices, which lead to better survival of the 
company in bad economic times and allow it to pull out of problems more 
quickly than other companies, which saves jobs.
111
  Even more 
commentators argue that the dramatic increase in CEO compensation is 
understandable when one looks at the corresponding dramatic increase in 
the asset value of the corporations in question.
112
  As pointed out 
previously, just because a salary is high, that does not necessarily make it 
excessive.
113
  One reason for high salaries is that boards think that having 
their respective CEOs in the top half of the salaries of executives makes 
them look strong.
114
  Obviously, if everybody wants to be in the top fifty 
percent, that top will continue to get higher and higher every year.
115
 
Commentators have stated that even though high levels of pay may 
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have “allowed U.S. corporations to attract and motivate perhaps the 
greatest managerial generation in economic history,”116 it is also the case 
that “[s]ince the advent of the modern corporation, executive pay has been 
vilified by the media, targeted for reform by activists, and regulated by the 
government.”117  Some have argued that one rarely hears about the evils of 
high executive compensation when things are going well, but when there is 
a downturn in the economy, activist shareholders and politicians complain 
about “corporate greed run amok.”118  Regulators also try to achieve 
increased government control during economic and stock market declines, 
but then slow these efforts once recoveries take place.
119
 
Some commentators hold the position that since the corporate 
governance system of the United States has essentially worked well, we 
should be leery of any significant changes to the balance of power between 
boards and shareholders.
120
  This again bolsters my proposal of a modest 
improvement that targets the outliers with a tested method unlikely to 
cause dramatic negative consequences.  Even optimal contract theorists 
admit that outliers exist where executive pay packages are too large and in 
fact reward mediocre or even poor performance.
121
  Furthermore, even the 
commentators who think that courts should have a minimal role in internal 
corporate governance believe that it would be appropriate for courts to act 
in outlier or extreme cases.
122
  Finally, whether there is a problem with 
executive compensation or not, the perception of a problem seems to 
persist, which creates a possible issue in and of itself.  As a former SEC 
chairman stated, “the restoration of public confidence in our markets is 
fundamental to ensuring that we retain the primacy of America as the 
foremost capital market in the world.”123  History, however, is full of 
lessons of how government regulation of business—in particular executive 
compensation—can backfire.  With this in mind, I turn to the next section 
in which I discuss some of the failed attempts to address the question of 
executive compensation. 
C.  Past Attempts to Regulate Executive Compensation 
One basic reason to avoid government action in setting pay packages is 
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that it is basically impossible for the government to evaluate the specific 
value of a particular CEO at a particular firm during a particular moment in 
time.  For example, if a firm sees an outgoing CEO as a failure, his salary 
could be reduced to one dollar and the firm still would not want to keep 
him (even if he looks good “on paper”), but conversely, an incoming CEO 
may be able to negotiate a salary that seems exorbitant from the outside 
and yet, to the shareholders who view him as capable of fixing a sinking 
ship, it may feel like a bargain.
124
  Given this state of affairs, many would 
argue that the government should not take on the endeavor of setting CEO 
salaries.  In fact, the legislature has shown some reluctance until now to 
impose caps on payment and in other contexts has explicitly declined to do 
so when it avoided introducing rate regulation or authorizing courts to 
second-guess directors in the area of management fees.
125
  As Professor 
Epstein has argued, every business “operates in its own distinctive 
environment in which compensation formulas have to interact with the 
patterns of shareholder control, the type of direct regulation in place and 
the rapid movement in product markets.”126  At the same time, even with 
the generally acknowledged limitations of government intervention in this 
arena, the government has tried to indirectly influence executive 
compensation in myriad ways.  
In recent years, many attempts have been made to slow executive 
compensation, to seemingly little avail.  For example, President Clinton led 
the effort to change IRS regulations to define individual employee 
compensation of over one million dollars as excessive and not deductible 
by corporations.
127
  The impact of this attempt was a threefold increase in 
executive compensation in the following eight years
128
 because of the way 
that the change was structured.  Indeed, in 1993, the IRS implemented 
Section 162(m), which limited tax deductions for executive pay over one 
million dollars; a significant exception to the law, however, was the fact 
that pay linked to performance remained deductible.
129
  The primary effect 
was a substantial shift by corporations to increase the amount of anything 
resembling “performance-based” stock options as opposed to flat salaries, 
potentially contributing to the increase in executive compensation.
130
  
Furthermore, in circumstances where the government tried to reduce the 
attractiveness of practices like golden parachutes by imposing higher taxes 
on them, some corporations increased the amount of compensation to 
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offset the increased tax burden.
131
  Commentators have noticed that when 
the government has tried to limit corporate payment plans, corporations 
have generally found a way around the limitations through alternative 
means,
132
 which has usually resulted in the shareholders paying even more 
than they had before the government intervened.  
Another legislative attempt to control executive compensation 
originated many decades ago in the form of disclosure obligations.
133
  In 
fact, the SEC has been dealing with disclosure of executive compensation 
for the last seventy years, and in 2006, it adopted even more extensive 
compensation disclosure requirements.
134
  Scholars have claimed that 
social pressure applied to executives would be sufficient to limit excessive 
compensation and therefore all we really need is effective disclosure 
requirements.
135
  Yet, given the so-called ratcheting effect, this does not 
seem like a viable solution.  The ratcheting effect is due to the fact that “a 
third of companies want their CEO’s pay package to be in the top 25%, 
and no company wants to pay their CEO below the industry average.”136  
Consequently, disclosure actually results in higher executive salaries since 
effectively “an increase for one will create increases for all.”137  As 
scholars have pointed out, the SEC’s expanded disclosure requirements 
made detailed comparisons of CEO pay packages possible and exacerbated 
the ratcheting effect.
138
  There is also some evidence that people feel 
empowered to take even more advantage of a situation once their conflicts 
of interest have been revealed,
139
 so disclosure requirements can further 
increase the likelihood that a CEO will ask for a very high salary. 
Some commentators have also suggested that since shareholders do not 
have much recourse after they are informed of large compensation 
packages, disclosure is unlikely to have strong effects.
140
  Even more 
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recently, through the Dodd-Frank Act, public corporations are now 
required to give their shareholders a vote to either approve or disapprove 
pay packages given to specific executives,
141
 which is also known as “say 
on pay” legislation.  This vote, however, neither binds the corporation nor 
implies any additional duties.
142
  Some scholars have commented that at 
least in some contexts, the “say on pay” requirements will make directors 
more attentive and could deter some of the more egregious abuses of 
executive compensation.
143
  Nonetheless, given the failures of the previous 
disclosure regulations, I am dubious that any significant success will result.  
A number of experts have called for more significant substantive 
regulation from the government in the form of a greater role for the SEC.
144
  
The possibility of the SEC becoming more involved with corporate 
governance is not new.  It dates back over seventy-five years, to at least the 
time of Justice William O. Douglas, who advocated for increased SEC 
regulation of corporate affairs.
145
  Furthermore, as previously mentioned,
146
 
the possibility of federal intervention in corporate law becomes important 
in times “when systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist 
payoff,”147 which may currently be the case.  At the same time, increased 
substantive regulation does have large difficulties even beyond its potential 
undesirability, ranging from the extensive study required to adequately 
design it to the increased costs for implementation and monitoring.
148
  
Another worry associated with increased regulation is that enhancing the 
SEC’s powers is potentially problematic due to the agency’s tendency to 
further expand its jurisdiction in times of economic crises or scandal.
149
  
Even a former chairman of the SEC has stated that it is not the 
government’s role, but rather the role of shareholders and the board of 
directors to determine how much an executive should be paid.
150
  Given 
these limits of legislation and agency regulation, it is important to 
understand the function of the court system in the area of executive 
compensation.  
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Many commentators have argued that if courts would even 
occasionally hold boards liable and review compensation awards, this 
would encourage directors (and their legal advisers) to bargain more 
forcefully with executives, incentivize directors to request more defensible 
initial packages, and ultimately reduce the packages themselves.
151
  
Furthermore, the traditional argument that courts lack the ability to 
influence executive compensation is at least partially countered by the 
courts’ known ability to evaluate pay in the context of insolvent 
corporations, closed corporations, and partnerships.
152
  As I will delineate 
in the next section, however, there are limitations to having courts address 
the problem of executive compensation.  
D.  The Court System and Executive Compensation 
As described previously, the hurdles encountered by prospective 
litigants in the current system are numerous and include overcoming both a 
demand requirement and the business judgment rule and/or attempting to 
establish a waste claim.
153
  All of these obstacles are potentially fatal on 
their own and, collectively, they spell almost-certain death for prospective 
litigation. 
The demand requirement is the condition in a derivative lawsuit that a 
plaintiff shareholder must first demand that the board of directors take 
action before she is allowed to start litigation.
154
  The plaintiff must show 
that demand was “futile” by showing that either the board was not 
disinterested or that it did not exercise proper business judgment in the 
making of the decision.
155
  The demand requirement exists for very 
legitimate reasons.  As the Supreme Court of Delaware has stated, “A 
cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware 
is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs 
of the corporation.”156  Frequent investor involvement in corporate affairs 
is not the model under which the U.S. corporation has thrived and could in 
fact lead to disruption in “the very mechanism that makes the public 
corporation practicable—namely, the vesting of authoritative control in the 
board of directors.”157  In light of the intended limited role of shareholders, 
“the demand requirement . . . exists at the threshold, first to insure that a 
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stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a 
safeguard against strike suits.”158  In Aronson v. Lewis,159 the court held 
that the fact that a self-interested individual selected the directors was not 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of independence.
160
  In the context 
of demand futility, under the test in Aronson, it is virtually impossible for a 
plaintiff to make a showing sufficient to litigate the question of 
compensation in a publicly held corporation.
161
 
Even if she meets the demand requirement, a potential plaintiff would 
face the business judgment rule.  Pursuant to the business judgment rule, 
courts will generally defer to decisions made by boards of directors in 
relation to executive compensation.
162
  The business judgment rule is often 
invoked in the executive compensation context.
163
  In Brehm v. Eisner,
164
 
the Supreme Court of Delaware stated: “It is the essence of business 
judgment for a board to determine if a particular individual warrants large 
amounts of money, whether in the form of current salary or severance 
provisions.”165  Delaware’s application of the business judgment rule to 
executive compensation has established that “irrationality” is the outer 
bound of the evaluation and, hence, no more detailed evaluation of the 
directors’ decision is to be conducted.166  The essential questions are 
whether the board committed “waste” in its decision making and whether it 
acted “in good faith”; specifically, this is a “process” evaluation only, and 
the precise substantive outcome is not relevant.
167
  
Therefore, potential litigants in executive compensation contexts are 
left with the option of attempting to prove “waste.”  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey recently reaffirmed the high threshold imposed by the waste 
requirement.  In Seidman v. Clifton Savings Bank,
168
 the court stated that 
“to prove waste, plaintiff must show that compensation is so one sided that 
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no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”169  The court repeatedly 
referred to the idea that for a compensation package to be classified as 
waste, it had to be totally without value to the corporation and essentially 
equivalent to a gift.
170
  The court further pointed to other decisions in 
which both New Jersey and Delaware courts had decided that to establish 
waste, a plaintiff had to show that “an expense served absolutely no 
corporate benefit whatsoever.”171  An earlier opinion from Delaware stated: 
“The standard for a waste claim is high and the test is ‘extreme [and] very 
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff.’”172  As an example of how 
difficult this standard can be to meet, in Seidman, the court held that even 
though the directors that had testified could not explain their actions, and 
even though they awarded themselves the maximum amount available, 
they were still not liable for waste.
173
  Specifically, the court stated that 
although the plans appeared unreasonable to the plaintiffs, there was a 
basis for them and they were “not so far outside the norm as to require this 
Court to step in and modify them.”174  Ultimately, the position was upheld 
that a court had to be persuaded “that no person of sound business 
judgment would have found that the benefits conferred were completely 
unreasonable based on the services performed.”175  Essentially, where the 
payment was made in a rational attempt to acquire or keep a talented 
executive, there would be no waste.
176
  This is clearly a very high hurdle.  
The U.S. Senate has even pointed out in similar settings that “the standard 
of corporate waste was unduly restrictive.”177 
Scholars have commented that going back over a century, courts have 
almost never overturned board decisions regarding executive 
compensation
178
 even though there would have been some advantages to 
doing so.  For example, while the business judgment rule should be used 
“when the prospect of litigation genuinely threatens the wellbeing of the 
corporation,” it sometimes effectively “prevents shareholder derivative 
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 44. 
172 In re 3Com Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 25, 1999) (citation omitted). 
173 See Seidman, 14 A.3d at 44, 56 (holding that a factual finding that “the [d]irectors who 
testified . . . lacked a certain amount of sophistication and ability to explain their actions” was 
insufficient to prove that the contested compensation packages amounted to corporate waste). 
174 Id.   
175 Id. at 45 (emphasis omitted). 
176 Jennifer S. Martin, supra note 8, at 499. 
177 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1970), reprinted in 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901). 
178 Telman, supra note 50, at 872. 
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suits from serving their purpose as a check on management.”179  
Furthermore, when there are conflicts between a board of directors and 
managers, even though legally the board should always prevail, practically 
it often does so only in response to outside pressures like shareholder 
derivative suits.
180
  Finally, the facts that litigation is expensive and that 
shareholder derivative litigation is especially expensive
181
 should be used 
to tailor any such litigation to maximize its benefits rather than eliminate it 
altogether. 
III.  CORPORATE 36(B):  A NEW PROPOSAL TO LIMIT EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 
A.  Adopting the Lessons from the Investment Company Act to Fashion a 
Remedy for Executive Compensation 
When the question is asked of who decides corporate questions, there 
is no doubt that the answer should be the “the board of directors.”182  
Nevertheless, that does not mean that shareholders should never be able to 
influence decisions. Bebchuk and Fried point out that “[i]ndependence, 
even coupled with incentive schemes, cannot secure shareholder interests 
unless there is some mechanism at the end of the chain that makes the 
designers of incentive schemes . . . accountable to shareholders,”183 and 
“the most effective way to improve board performance is to increase the 
power of shareholders vis-à-vis directors.”184  Fortunately, there is already 
a mechanism that would begin to accomplish this goal without disruptive 
changes and that has been tested for over three decades.  Section 36(b) of 
the ICA as amended in 1970
185
 could provide a key tool in addressing the 
issue of executive compensation. 
Congress should adopt legislation regarding executive compensation 
packages in public corporations that is similar to and incorporates the court 
decisions dealing with Section 36(b) of the ICA as amended.  As 
mentioned, this new legislation would be referred to as Corporate 36(b).  
The proposed language—with alterations incorporating my proposal—
reads as follows: 
The [CEO and top five officers]
186
 of a [publicly traded 
corporation] shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with 
                                                                                                                          
179 Id. at 865. 
180 Id. at 856. 
181 Id. at 866. 
182 Bainbridge, supra note 54, at 1619. 
183 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 7, at 206. 
184 Id. at 207. 
185 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
186 This can be determined by who earns the five highest salaries at any given corporation. 
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respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of 
payments of a material nature, paid by such [corporation], or 
by the security holders thereof, to such [CEO or officers] or 
any affiliated person of such [CEO or officers].  An action 
may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or 
by a security holder of such [corporation] on behalf of such 
[corporation], against such [CEO or officer], or any affiliated 
person of such [CEO or officer], or any other person 
enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a 
fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, 
for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation 
or payments paid by such [corporation] or by the security 
holders thereof to such [CEO or officer] or person.  With 
respect to any such action the following provisions shall 
apply: 
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any 
defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty. 
(2) In any such action approval by the board of 
directors of such [corporation] of such compensation or 
payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for 
such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval 
of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other 
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, 
by the shareholders of such [corporation], shall be given such 
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all 
the circumstances. 
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained 
against any person other than the recipient of such 
compensation or payments, and no damages or other relief 
shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of 
such compensation or payments.  No award of damages shall 
be recoverable for any period prior to one year before the 
action was instituted.  Any award of damages against such 
recipient shall be limited to the actual damages resulting 
from the breach of fiduciary duty and shall in no event 
exceed the amount of compensation or payments received 




The purposes behind the ICA can be useful to see how they fit with the 
                                                                                                                          
187 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
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context of public corporation executive compensation.  These purposes 
were discussed in the legislative history of the ICA: 
1.  What is intended:  (a) That the investment adviser is 
entitled to make a profit. 
2.  What is not intended: (a) That a cost-plus type of 
contract is required[;] (b) That general concepts of rate 
regulation as applies to public utilities are to be introduced[;] 
(c) That the standard of “corporate waste” is to be applied[;] 
(d) That management fees should be tested on whether they 
are “reasonable”[;] (e) That a congressional finding has been 
made that the present industry level or that the fee of any 
particular adviser is too high[;] (f) That the Court is 
authorized to substitute its business judgment for that of the 
directors[;] (g) That the responsibility for management is to 
be shifted from directors to the judiciary[;] (h) That 
economies of scale are necessarily applicable at every stage 
of growth of the Fund. 
3.  The test of fairness is to be made by the Court, in 
part:  (a) By reference to industry practice[;] (b) By reference 
to industry level of management fees. 
4.  The Court shall determine whether[:] (c) The 
attention of directors was fixed on their responsibilities[;] (d) 
The directors requested and obtained information reasonably 
necessary to evaluate the terms of the management 
contract[;] (e) The directors having the primary responsibility 
for looking after the best interests of the Fund’s shareholders, 
have evaluated such information accordingly.
188
 
In sum, “Section 36(b) represents a political compromise of a highly 
emotional nature which eschews rate regulation for personal services but 
nonetheless caps compensation at market acceptability accompanied by 
good faith and fair disclosure of that range.”189 
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the validity of this application of 
the ICA as it relates to executive compensation of mutual fund advisors.
190
  
Scholars have suggested that to affect executive compensation, either the 
federal government or states should act to empower shareholders to take 
action when necessary.
191
  This proposed legislation would accomplish that 
                                                                                                                          
188 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1422, (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
aff’d, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).  
189 Id. 
190 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430 (2010).   
191 See Jennifer S. Martin, supra note 8, at 534. 
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objective while guarding against the dangers of illegitimate strike suits and 
other dangers arising from the self-interests of the parties involved.   
In addition to the pre-existing requirement that a board be independent, 
Section 36(b) provides an extra requirement to ensure that boards will 
conduct arm’s-length bargaining, namely the obligation that an 
“investment advisor assume the status of a fiduciary of the fund and its 
investors with respect to compensation received for its services.”192  
Nonetheless, the burden established by Section 36(b) and the cases 
interpreting it is not very high when one considers the fact that since the 
law was implemented in 1970, there have been over one hundred cases 
claiming a breach of the fiduciary duty but not a single plaintiff has won; 
thus, no court has ever held that a mutual fund advisor has breached his 
fiduciary duty.
193
  This does not mean, however, that Section 36(b) serves 
no purpose.  The existence of the possible litigation could prevent truly 
egregious instances from occurring.  The law could also help directors 
keep investment advisor wages down by giving them an argument during 
negotiations.  
Scholars have previously suggested that there would be benefits in 
applying fiduciary duties to compensation package analysis, but through 
the Delaware state court system.
194
  While I think that this suggestion is 
laudable, it is inferior to my proposal for two reasons.  First, due to the 
increased public pressure on the federal government to act, Delaware is 
unlikely to make a substantial change quickly enough to preempt federal 
intervention.  Given Delaware’s reluctance to ultimately hold executives or 
corporations accountable in compensation cases, the trend on the part of 
the State’s courts to move more in the direction of imposing these types of 
fiduciary duties is unlikely to prove sufficient.  Second, even if Delaware 
courts did impose this kind of obligation, that would still not account for 
the majority of corporations in the country.  While Delaware is 
significantly more likely than any other state to serve as the place of 
incorporation, a lot of companies are not incorporated there.  
B.  The Parallels Between Investment Advisers and CEOs 
There are differences between a general corporation and a mutual fund, 
and one could argue that the relationship between an investment company 
and its fund manager, as opposed to that between a corporation and its 
executive, is different.
195
  When discussing the relationship between a 
                                                                                                                          
192 M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010).    
193 Id. 
194 See Thomas & Wells, supra note 20, at 849–50 (“With Delaware’s new emphasis on officers’ 
fiduciary duties, courts can and should assume such a role [of imposing heightened scrutiny on 
executive pay] again.”).  
195 As the Supreme Court observed: 
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mutual fund and its investment adviser, one court has stated: “[T]he fund 
often cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.  
Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual 
fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the 
American economy.”196  The investment adviser context is, however, not 
the only type of relationship in which arm’s-length bargaining can break 
down.
197
  Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
argued: “Things work the same way for business corporations, which 
though not trusts are managed by persons who owe fiduciary duties of 
loyalty to investors . . . . Publicly traded corporations use the same basic 
procedures as mutual funds: a committee of independent directors sets the 
top managers’ compensation.”198  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the similarities between investment companies and 
corporations.  Specifically, with respect to their shared origins, the Court 
emphasized that investment companies and corporations alike are 
incorporated under state rather than federal law.
199
 
The ICA was created to protect shareholders from significant conflicts 
of interest.
200
  Some of these protections increased the similarities between 
a mutual fund and a corporation.  For example, one of the ways in which 
the ICA attempts to achieve its goal is through the requirement that “no 
more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors could be affiliated with the 
adviser.”201  Publicly traded corporations have a similar requirement for 
director independence.
202
  Section 36(b) in the ICA was originally drafted 
because of public concern regarding fees charged in a specific type of 
investment fund and was applied to other types of funds
203
 due to the 
                                                                                                                          
Unlike most corporations, an investment company is typically created and managed 
by a pre-existing external organization known as an investment adviser.  Because 
the adviser generally supervises the daily operation of the fund and often selects 
affiliated persons to serve on the company’s board of directors, the relationship 
between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts of 
interest. 
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
196 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 See supra Part II.A. 
198 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 
(2010). 
199 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979). 
200 Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422. 
201 Id. 
202 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.  
203 The two different types of funds are the closed-ended and open-ended fund.  The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals described the difference:  
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similar possibility of abuse of the fiduciary relationship in matters of 
fees.
204
  This same potential for abuse exists in public corporations.  
Therefore, even though there are important distinctions between typical 
corporations and mutual funds,
205
 the similarities when it comes to matters 
of compensation are striking.  
If we focus on the problem—i.e., potential excessive compensation 
caused by conflicts of interest as opposed to the distinctions in the forms of 
the entities—it is easy to recognize the similarities.  Experts commonly 
accept that the concern regarding conflicts of interest in the mutual fund 
industry is what led Congress to the “large-scale federalization” of that 
industry in 1940.
206
  The basic conflict at issue in both public corporate 
settings and investment fund adviser settings is a conflict between those 
wishing to sell at the highest price (here, employees wanting high 
compensation) and those wishing to buy at the lowest price (here, 
employers wanting to keep pay low).  This conflict is usually settled in a 
“market economy by ensuring that competition prevails.”207  As previously 
mentioned, however, this approach may not work optimally in the 
executive compensation setting.
208
  In the ICA context, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that “Congress added § 36(b) to the [Act] in 1970 because it 
concluded that the shareholders should not have to rely solely on the fund’s 
directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased 
disinterestedness of the board.”209  The intention behind the provision was 
to correct a market failure, and a similar instrument could fulfill that 
function for CEOs. 
When Congress originally passed Section 36(b) of the ICA, it was not 
                                                                                                                          
A closed-end investment company, unlike a traditional open-end mutual fund, has 
fixed capitalization and may sell only the number of shares of its own stock as 
originally authorized.  It does not redeem its securities at the option of the 
shareholder.  Shares of a closed-end fund are traded on a secondary market; that is, 
its stock, like that of any publicly owned corporation, is usually listed on a national 
exchange.  The most pertinent difference between open- and closed-end investment 
companies is that closed-end funds are authorized under the ICA to use leverage to 
increase the stream of current income through the sale of preferred stock so long as 
there is 200% asset coverage for these securities.   
Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 740 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002).  
204 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1982) superseded in 
part by statute, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,689, 52,691 (Oct. 19, 1994) (requiring separate categorization of 
management fees, distribution fees, and other fees). 
205 See Langevoort, supra note 139, at 1031 (discussing the differences between mutual funds and 
corporations). 
206 Id. at 1020.  
207 John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence 
and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 158–59 (2007). 
208 See supra Part II.A. 
209 Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1428 (2010) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  
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trying to “fundamentally revise the system itself,” but rather to “diminish 
the risk of adviser self-dealing.”210  Congress was attempting to provide a 
federal remedy that was significantly narrower than common law fiduciary 
duty doctrines.
211
  In the 1970s, a study commissioned by the SEC 
identified problems with the independence of investment company boards 
and the compensation being paid to advisers.
212
  In an attempt to correct 
these perceived problems, Congress amended the ICA, primarily by adding 
two shareholder protections.
213
  The first attempted to require more 
independence from the directors and impose additional responsibilities 
upon them.
214
  Some of these additional responsibilities include an annual 
review of advisers’ compensation and require that a majority of the 
directors must approve of the compensation.
215
  The second amendment 
designed to protect shareholders was a requirement that advisers be subject 
to a “fiduciary duty” in relation to their compensation and gave individual 
investors a right of action in case of breach of that duty.
216
  Similar to 
public corporations today, before the 1970 amendments, shareholders in 
investment companies had a very limited set of options: “[S]hareholders 
challenging investment adviser fees under state law were required to meet 
common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable or 
unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ 
or ‘shocking.’”217  To address the problems surrounding investment 
advisers, Congress had to craft a delicate compromise between the SEC’s 
proposal that shareholders be empowered to bring actions against fees they 
deemed “unreasonable” and the industry’s fear that this type of statute 
would effectively give the commission ratemaking authority.
218
  The 
Supreme Court pointed out that the final “fiduciary duty” standard enacted 
was somewhere in between the two; it was more favorable than the 
previous remedies for the shareholders (i.e., waste-based litigation), but it 
did not permit courts to determine if a rate was “reasonable.”219  
In Jones v. Harris Associates,
220
 the Supreme Court explained that 
something of a consensus had developed over the previous twenty-five 
years between the SEC, many federal courts, and scholarly commentators, 
all who supported the analysis in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
                                                                                                                          
210 Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 2002). 
211 Id.  
212 Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422. 
213 Id. at 1423. 
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Management, Inc.
221
  The previous decisions pointed out that Congress had 
not made it clear what was meant by “fiduciary duty,” but they still 
established a basic test to be employed in the determination.  The Court 
stated: “[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a 
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-
length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.”222  The Second 
Circuit continued by explaining that to be guilty of violating this provision, 
“the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large 
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could 
not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining”223 and that when 
courts made this determination, all pertinent factors had to be taken into 
account.
224
  The Court pointed out in other contexts how fiduciary duty 
principles are appropriately used across different sets of circumstances.
225
  
Whether it is in a bankruptcy proceeding, investment advisor compensation 
context, or as I propose in a public corporation executive compensation 
situation, the standard should be the same.  As the Court stated, “The 
essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the 
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.  If it does not, 
equity will set it aside.”226  It should be noted that some commentators 
have argued that an arm’s-length bargain is a theoretical construct made 
impossible in practice by frictions like contracting and transaction costs, 
and that such a bargain is therefore an inappropriate benchmark.
227
  One 
could, however, have an “optimal” or “efficient” contract that maximizes 
the net expected value after transaction costs or “frictions” are taken into 
account.
228
   Using these criteria, some defend the current U.S. corporate 
structure as possibly the best in light of various costs, including those 
imposed by the U.S. legal and regulatory system.
229
  Nonetheless, this does 
not preclude the possibility that the system could be made more efficient 
with changes to the legal or regulatory structure.
230
 
                                                                                                                          
221 Id. at 1425; see also Jones v. Harris, 537 F.3d 728, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (noting a “slew of positive citations” to Gartenberg).  
222 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 
Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426 (agreeing with Gartenberg’s interpretation of “fiduciary duty” under § 36(b)). 
223 Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
224 Id. at 929. 
225 See Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (explaining how fiduciary duty principles apply in bankruptcy 
and trusts). 
226 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939)). 
227 Core et al., supra note 92, at 1159. 
228 Id. at 1160. 
229 See id. at 1161 (“U.S. corporate governance may in fact be extremely good given the existence 
of information costs, transactions costs, and the existing U.S. legal and regulatory system.”). 
230 Id. 
 2012] MISSION IMPOSSIBLE 579 
C.  Corporate 36(b) and Applying the Gartenberg Standard to 
Corporations 
The ICA was clarified in 1982 in Gartenberg, whose reasoning was 
then upheld by the Supreme Court in Jones.  Many of the factors that the 
Gartenberg court held should be applied to investment fund advisers
231
 can 
be directly applied to all public corporations.  For example, factors that 
should be taken into account include the nature and quality of the services 
provided, comparative fee structures of other executives, and the 
independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in 
evaluating adviser compensation.  The Gartenberg court made it clear that, 
in accordance with the legislative history of the ICA, the “fiduciary duty” 
obligation is not to be equated with an evaluation of the “reasonableness” 
of the fee.
232
  In fact, the Gartenberg court pointed out that the Senate 
report explicitly stated that the court is not authorized “to substitute its 
business judgment for that of a mutual fund’s board of directors in the area 
of management fees.”233  The shift from demanding “reasonable” behavior 
to imposing a “fiduciary duty” seems to have been relatively small, with 
the main distinction being a focus on the conduct of the investment adviser 
as opposed to that of the fund directors, which resulted in the ultimate test 
of “whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what 
would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all the 
surrounding circumstances.”234  In the analogous situation of a public 
corporation, that would mean an increased focus on the executive who is to 
receive the compensation, as well as on the board that is giving it to him.  
Most litigation to date has focused on the breach of duty by the board; the 
occasional claims that have been brought against the executive have been 




Finally, the Jones Court asserted that in evaluating a board’s 
determination of an executive compensation award, a court needs to 
consider both procedural and substantive considerations.
236
  The Court 
went on to say, “[w]here a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing 
                                                                                                                          
231 These factors include: (1) the nature and quality of the services provided to the fund and 
shareholders; (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser; (3) any “fall-out financial benefits,”—those 
collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser because of her relationship with the mutual fund; (4) 
comparative fee structure (meaning a comparison of the fees with those paid by similar funds); and (5) 
the independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in evaluating adviser 
compensation.  Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929–32 (2d Cir. 1982);  
see also Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010) (citing three of the Gartenberg factors). 
232 Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
235 See infra Part III.E.  
236 Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429. 
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investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should afford 
commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining process.”237  
This is not to say that a well-deliberated compensation plan is 
automatically acceptable.  As the Court indicated, even a board in 
possession of all the relevant information may award an excessive fee, “but 
such a determination must be based on evidence that the fee is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length 
bargaining.”238 The ‘“so disproportionately large’ standard reflects this 
congressional choice to rely largely upon independent director ‘watchdogs’ 
to protect shareholders interests.”239  Thus, there is still supposed to be a 
recognition that the board of directors is responsible for the decisions of 
the corporation and that shareholders are only able to step in via the courts 
when the board is clearly not doing its job.  On the other hand, if the 
procedures used by the board were deficient or if significant pieces of 
information were withheld, then the court should look more thoroughly at 
the results.
240
  This establishes a sliding scale where the more thorough a 
decision is, the more credibility it is given, while an evaluation of the 
substance of the decision still takes place.  This evaluation is intended to 
take into account all of the pertinent information,
241
 even if the information 
itself is flawed.  For example, as I alluded to previously, one of the 
problems with recent attempts to lower executive compensation is the issue 
of ratcheting up salaries.
242
  This can make using other corporations as 
examples in the context of appropriate salaries a less-than-trustworthy 
measure.  The Second Circuit indicated a similar problem in the investment 
fund industry when it explained that using other compensation plans as 
benchmarks may not be helpful due to the fact that competition could be 
virtually nonexistent.
243
  Given the ratcheting effect, while more 
competition may exist for public corporations than in the investment 
management field, prices below the ever-increasing norm may equally be 
near non-existent.  It should be noted, however, that even with such an 
acknowledged limitation, the Gartenberg court did specify that this factor 
can still be “taken into account.”244  
With this totality-of-the-circumstances approach, it may seem that 
there are few rigid guidelines, which is true and a benefit of the proposal, 
but there are some clear rules.  For example, the Court has specified that 
                                                                                                                          
237 Id.  
238 Id. at 1429–30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“[j]udicial price setting does not accompany fiduciary duties”245 and that 
courts are ill-equipped to make price rate calculations; plus Congress 
explicitly rejected this possibility when it refused to adopt a 
“reasonableness” standard.246  Furthermore, it is clear that it would not be 
necessary to show any attempt to defraud or even allege that a defendant 
engaged in personal misconduct.
247
  In fact, it would not even be enough to 
show that a better bargain may have been possible; rather it must be 
demonstrated that compensation was paid under an agreement that was 
“unfair.”248  This standard may lead some to think that the bar is set too 
low and will result in too many judgments against seemingly innocent 
defendants, but that has not been the outcome in the investment advisor 
setting.  The Gartenberg standard has not been overly burdensome on fund 
advisers, and the vast majority of litigation in excessive fee cases has been 
resolved in favor of the defendants, with a few settlements taking place in 
which the defendants agreed to a reduction in their fee agreements.
249
  
These rules that have been applied to investment fund advisers for over 
thirty years could be used for public corporations, but to what result?  
What would be gained from implementing this proposal? 
D.  Benefits of Corporate 36(b) 
There are three primary benefits to this proposal: (1) lower initial 
compensation demands; (2) the empowerment of compensation 
committees; and (3) the avoidance of possible preemption by the federal 
government.   
Holding CEOs to a fiduciary duty will provide not only remedies but 
will act as a prophylactic in that it will induce CEOs to request a lower 
compensation package in the first place.
250
  In this case, this prophylactic 
purpose will be achieved in two ways.  First, executives will be on notice 
that they are considered fiduciaries when negotiating their own pay 
packages and that they will not be able to approach the situation with the 
sole goal of maximizing their personal salary.  Obviously, part of their 
objective will still be to maximize their compensation, but this will now be 
accomplished by having pay packages that are essentially beyond reproach, 
such as to avoid not only the loss of some of the pay itself, but also the cost 
in time and money of having to go through protracted litigation.  
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Therefore, the payment that CEOs will seek will be the one that best 
balances the cost of potential litigation and the actual pay received.  The 
second way that the initial compensation demand will be lowered is simply 
due to the increased attention that pay packages will receive.  Once the 
plaintiffs’ bar is aware of this new source of work, some attorneys will 
begin to target it.  This means that practiced attorneys and their staffs will 
constantly be on the lookout for inappropriate pay packages and for 
corporations whose shareholders they may be able to represent.  Given this 
increased and possibly constant scrutiny, executives will have a strong 
incentive to request packages that will be unlikely to turn into the source of 
litigation, justified or otherwise. 
The second advantage of this proposal is to give executive 
compensation committees more leverage to resist if the executives are still 
requesting exorbitant pay.  As things stand now, a committee can point to 
the “say on pay” measure and the issue of bad press, but there are no 
significant likely consequences and both sides know it.  If it were possible 
for a lawsuit to be successful, the committee would not only feel 
encouraged to resist the executives’ demands to avoid the suit, but would 
also have a very plausible argument during negotiations. They could 
effectively say, “Mr. Smith, we would love to give you two hundred 
million dollars for three months’ work, but doing so would result in a 
lawsuit under Corporate 36(b).”  Therefore, this proposal will not only 
reinforce the incentives of boards to limit executive compensation, but it 
will also increase their ability to do so. 
The third advantage of this proposal is the decreased possibility of 
government usurpation.  As previously pointed out, the federal government 
is most likely to intervene in corporate governance issues during times of 
economic turmoil and scandal.
251
  The last few years have been some of the 
most tumultuous years for the economy since the Great Depression.  It 
seems likely that the government is going to act, and this proposal allows 
executive compensation to be addressed in a more effective way while 
leaving matters in the hands of the boards of directors.  If the boards fail, 
the proposal puts the issue in the hands of the shareholders, who are in the 
best position to find a tailored solution.   
E.  Possible Objections to Corporate 36(b)  
Like all legislative proposals, Corporate 36(b) is likely to face 
opposition for a variety of reasons.  There are several arguments against 
involving the courts in the compensation question.  Some of them include 
the claims that courts are ill-suited to evaluate compensation packages, that 
boards and not courts should be addressing this issue, that it may increase 
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shareholder litigation,
252
 and that it may jeopardize federalism.  First, I will 
address the federalism concern, which amounts to the argument that 
corporate law should be left to the states and that the federal government 
should not interfere.  Second, I will examine the objection concerning 
strike or nuisance suits, i.e., that legislation will open the door for massive 
amounts of litigation solely aimed at extorting sums of money from 
corporations.  Finally, I will respond to the criticism that boards and not 
courts should be answering these questions.   
Many scholars and commentators believe that state competition has 
helped to maximize the value of American corporations and that because 
any federal intervention will not have a competitive component, it is 
undesirable.
253
  General incorporation statutes have existed since at least 
1811, but before the twentieth century there was no federal corporate law; 
rather, all corporate law was local.
254
  Historically, a belief dominated that 
market forces would be a more effective driver of corporate behavior than 
legislative intervention and that the desire for corporate charters would 
motivate states to implement optimal laws, which would not occur in the 
federal legislative process.
255
  The argument is that we want states to 
fashion laws between which corporations and shareholders can choose.  
This position has both supporters and detractors.  The supporters argue that 
this decentralization will promote a race to the top in which states will 
produce the best laws to attract companies for incorporation, while 
detractors believe that it will cause a race to the bottom because states will 
pander to executives who choose where to incorporate.
256
  These theories 
rely on the premise that states compete for corporate charters and that the 
only key difference is the direction of the race.  Other scholars have 
argued, however, that the competition is basically over, which they support 
by the observation that of the companies that incorporate outside their 
home state, eighty-five percent do so in Delaware.
257
  Early commentators 
trusted the benefits of state corporate law in part based upon the premise 
that states would be innovative in their laws, and thus the best solutions 
would result when corporations would choose from among them.
258
  It 
appears, however, that little innovation occurs because most states have 
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similar laws, with possibly only Delaware serving as an exception.
259
   
After the market crash of 1929, there was recognition of the impact 
that corporations could have on the entire country and of the possible need 
for federal regulation, a sentiment that resulted in the 1933 Securities Act 
and 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
260
  These laws marked the beginning of 
federal regulation of corporations,
261
 a trend whose final point is yet to be 
seen.  It may be true that there is officially no federal corporate law, but 
there is clearly a vast amount of federal law both targeted at and affecting 
corporations, ranging from insider trading laws to disclosure laws and to 
regulations regarding accounting.
262
  In some ways, the federal government 
already partially controls executive compensation; for example, under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, particular executive bonuses are subject to forfeiture 
under some circumstances.
263
  Therefore, regardless of whether one thinks 
that government control is a welcome trend, the fact remains that federal 
usurpation of significant aspects of corporate control has already occurred 
in areas such as securities trading, proxy statement and solicitation, and 
various types of fiduciary duty breaches prosecuted frequently as part of 
10b-5 fraud claims.
264
   
Even if it was an incontrovertible fact that states need not maintain 
authority in this domain because they do not truly compete, and even 
though the federal government already controls large sections of corporate 
governance, further encroachment by the federal government into state 
corporate law remains unjustified.  The Supreme Court recognized the 
desirability of limiting federal intrusion on state law in the area of mutual 
funds and deferred to state law when the ICA did not specifically address a 
litigated question.
265
  The Supreme Court has also stated that 
“[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds 
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”266  My proposal tries to minimize the intrusion of the federal 
government into state corporate law and to maintain as much control in the 
hands of corporations and individual states as possible. 
The second objection I will address is the claim that this proposal will 
cause a surge in nuisance lawsuits, to the detriment of both corporations 
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and the judicial system.  There are several mechanisms in place to limit 
this possibility.  Significantly, the original ICA modifies the traditional 
formulation of the fiduciary duty such as to require that the plaintiff bear 
the burden of proving that “the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length 
bargain would produce.”267  This will help to limit the number of strike 
suits.  Further mechanisms that reduce the number are courts’ explicit 
insistence that all factors be taken into account (including all relevant 
circumstances of the board’s review), and the use of benchmarking from 
other executive compensation packages.
268
  At the same time, the Court 
recognized the difficulty of using comparable executive compensation 
plans when it said: “By the same token, courts should not rely too heavily 
on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers.  
These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those 
challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s 
length.”269  Additionally, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 




A further disincentive against strike suits is the cap on damages to one 
year of an executive’s salary.271  In fact, given the limitations of the 
lawsuit, one could argue that the damages of a possible lawsuit are unlikely 
to act as a deterrent.
272
  In this setting, however, the monetary payout is just 
one and possibly the smaller of the true deterrent effects because not only 
is the litigation process unpleasant and to be avoided, but reputational 
harms to both the directors and CEOs are potentially much greater than any 
monetary award.  The intended result is that threatening reputational 
damage increases the potential impact on executives without producing an 
equal increase of the incentives for strike suit plaintiffs.  The harm to the 
reputation only results if the case is successful.  Meanwhile, in a typical 
strike suit, the way that a corporation calculates whether to settle takes into 
account the harm from the process itself.  A nuisance plaintiff could 
calculate that there is a ten percent chance of prevailing and winning a 
judgment of $1,000,000, and the litigation will cost the corporation 
$50,000 to defend whether it wins or loses.  Therefore, the suit is worth 
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$150,000 (ten percent of a million + $50,000).  If the nuisance plaintiff 
offers a settlement for less than $150,000, there are strong incentives for 
the corporation to settle.  Given that we are looking for legal solutions that 
benefit corporations, a law in this situation is only efficient if it benefits the 
corporation by more than $150,000.  Or, in other words, the value of the 
law has to be above $150,000; otherwise, that law is inefficient and would 
better be replaced with a different one.  In the case of Corporate 36(b), the 
defense against a nuisance lawsuit still costs $50,000, but the cost of losing 
is low due to the damages cap of one year’s salary combined with the 
extremely low likelihood of prevailing (approaching zero) for a true 
nuisance lawsuit.  Given these facts, the value of the suit is close to 
$50,000.  Nevertheless, the value of the reputation of the directors and 
CEOs is potentially very large to them, but it is not a value on which a 
nuisance plaintiff can capitalize as it only kicks in if he wins, which will 
not take place.  Hence, the value of a lawsuit under Corporate 36(b) is low 
for socially undesirable lawsuits (i.e., $50,000 for nuisance suits) but 
potentially very large for socially desirable lawsuits where plaintiffs have 
legitimate claims.  This all makes Corporate 36(b) a valuable and efficient 
law. 
The possibility of nuisance suits or strike suits was actually considered 
by the legislature in connection with the original ICA; at one point, to 
further discourage these types of suits, lawmakers even considered raising 
the standard of proof that a plaintiff would need to meet a requirement of 
“clear and convincing” evidence.273  Ultimately, the legislature determined 
this to be unnecessary, possibly because the standard for application of 
Section 36(b) is quite high.  It is almost as high as requiring the existence 
of “waste,” and in fact some commentators have equated the two even 
though Congress specified that the standard in Section 36(b) was supposed 
to be lower.
274
  Although no facts have yet resulted in liability for market 
fund investment advisers,
275
 the success of Section 36(b) may lie in the fact 
that the lingering possibility of a lawsuit reduces the starting point of the 
still very large pay packages of investment advisers.  Finally, although the 
cost of defending against litigation can be high,
276
 there is no evidence 
about how high or how much cost may be saved by encouraging lower pay 
packages in the first place.  It is difficult to put a price on the avoidance of 
litigation, but it appears that the benefits from the ICA of reducing 
investment adviser compensation outweigh that cost. 
The final objection that I want to address is the claim that executive 
compensation decisions should not be made by the court, but rather by the 
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boards of directors.  One reason for not wanting courts to conduct this type 
of evaluation is the complexity of the compensation negotiation, which can 
easily involve more than half a dozen different types of benefits, ranging 
from a base cash salary to jets and charitable donations.
277
  Standing alone, 
the existence of complexity is not a very compelling argument since, as I 
pointed out previously, courts often deal with similarly complex issues in 
other contexts.
278
  A better argument against courts making this 
determination was given by Judge Easterbrook when he said that salary, 
bonus, and stock options are: 
[C]onstrained by competition in several markets—firms that 
pay too much to managers have trouble raising money, 
because net profits available for distribution to investors are 
lower, and these firms also suffer in product markets because 
they must charge more and consumers turn elsewhere.  
Competitive processes are imperfect but remain superior to a 
“just price” system administered by the judiciary.  However 
weak competition may be at weeding out errors, the judicial 
process is worse—for judges can’t be turned out of office or 




Judge Posner responded to this point when he stated that Judge 
Easterbrook’s “economic analysis . . . is ripe for reexamination on the basis 
of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly 
traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of 
directors to police compensation.”280  
While addressing Judge Easterbrook’s objection, Judge Posner’s 
response does not fully answer the criticism that we prefer for boards to 
make these determinations and that effectively “the power to review is the 
power to decide.  If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we 
have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B.”281  The 
argument about boards amounts to saying that we actually want the 
authority to remain with A.  I agree that the board should be making 
determinations within a corporation, and for this reason my proposal is 
severely restricted and only the most egregious situations would be 
reviewed.  The goal of the original ICA and of this proposal is for the 
directors to control conflicts of interest.
282
  Congress wanted the directors 
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to work as “independent watchdogs” in the contentious relationship 
between investment advisers and their employers.
283
  In light of this, 
Section 36(b) specifically instructed courts to give board approval of an 
adviser’s compensation “such consideration . . . as is deemed appropriate 
under all the circumstances.”284  The two mechanisms for controlling this 
conflict were meant to be both independent and mutually reinforcing.
285
   
This proposal has the same goal.   
By allowing shareholders to have the right to file a federal lawsuit, 
both the incentive and ability of directors to maintain this “watchdog” 
status will be strengthened.  The possibility of suits will result in more 
attention and immediate action when compensation packages are 
particularly egregious.  This will cause board members to be even more 
mindful of their duties.  Furthermore, by having the ability to tell the 
executive that they cannot approve a compensation package because they 
could be sued will give board members more leverage in negotiations.  
Corporate 36(b) recognizes the tension between assisting the board with 
the fulfillment of its duties and removing authority from it.  The Supreme 
Court in Jones agreed with the Second Circuit’s view in Gartenberg of the 
importance of the board’s role when the Court stated that “the expertise of 
the independent trustees of a fund, whether they are fully informed about 
all facts bearing on the [investment adviser’s] service and fee, and the 
extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their duties” 
should all be considered when determining whether the trustees and the 
adviser breached their fiduciary duties under Section 36(b).
286
  This same 
analysis would apply under my Corporate 36(b) proposal.  Corporate 36(b) 
intends for the board of a public corporation to act as a “watchdog” to 
ensure that the amount of compensation paid to executives is appropriate 
and properly balances an executive’s desire to maximize his income with a 
corporation’s desire to minimize its expenses.  
After having pointed out the benefits of this proposal in the previous 
section and addressing foreseen criticisms in this section, I will now give a 
brief description of how Corporate 36(b) could have affected an actual case 
that many feel entailed excessive executive compensation. 
F.  Corporate 36(b) and Michael Ovitz of the Walt Disney Company 
In Brehm v. Eisner, one of several cases prompted by the hiring and 
firing of Michael Ovitz at The Walt Disney Company, the Delaware 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that in matters of executive compensation, 
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a board’s decision is entitled to “great deference.”287  The court went on to 
state:  “It is the essence of business judgment for a board to determine if a 
particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money.”288  But what 
happened in this case, and would the outcome have been any different if 
Corporate 36(b) had already been adopted? 
Michael Ovitz and The Walt Disney Company entered into an 
employment agreement in August of 1995 that was intended to establish 
Ovitz as the President of Disney for a term of at least five years; fourteen 
months later, Ovitz was terminated without cause, entitling him to a 
severance package worth approximately $130 million.
289
  Ovitz had been 
socially acquainted and professionally familiar with Disney’s CEO 
Michael Eisner for almost twenty-five years.
290
  Eisner had personally 
called all of the board members to tell them about Ovitz when the latter 
was under employment consideration, and Eisner discussed both his 
qualifications and their friendship.
291
  The chairman of the compensation 
committee cautioned that Ovitz’s salary would be above Disney’s CEO’s 
and at the top for any corporate officer, that the stock options he would 
receive were more generous than the standards routinely authorized at 
Disney, and that “corporate America would raise very strong criticism.”292  
Ovitz was also given a $7.5 million bonus (which was rescinded later after 
“more deliberate consideration”) for the services he performed during 
fiscal year 1996—the same services that led to his termination.293  In 
September of 1995, the compensation committee met for a total of one 
hour to consider, among other things, the terms of Ovitz’s employment, 
during which meeting a term sheet was distributed but without a copy of 
Ovitz’s employment agreement.294  The shareholders filed a lawsuit 
claiming in part “that Ovitz breached his fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty to Disney by (i) negotiating for and accepting the NFT (Non-Fault 
Termination) severance provisions of the OEA (Ovitz Employment 
Agreement), and (ii) negotiating a full NFT payout in connection with his 
termination.”295  The Chancellor established on summary judgment that 
Ovitz had not breached any fiduciary duty to Disney because he did not 
become a fiduciary until he formally started his position on October 1, 
1995, and by then the key conditions of the NFT provision had been 
negotiated; hence, the Court of Chancery held that Ovitz’s actions before 
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October 1 were not subject to fiduciary duty obligations.
296
  And once he 
was terminated without cause, Ovitz had the contractual right to obtain the 
benefits that the OEA specified for this type of termination, which were 
benefits negotiated at arm’s length before Ovitz became a fiduciary.297 
The court stated that, under Delaware law, neither future nor former 
directors owed any fiduciary duties, and so Ovitz could not have breached 
fiduciary duties after December 27, 1996.
298
  The OEA was the richest pay 
package ever offered to a corporate officer.
299
  In response to the claim that 
Disney had engaged in waste, the court explained: 
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must 
shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was so one 
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment 
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate 
consideration.  A claim of waste will arise only in the rare, 
unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or 
give away corporate assets.  This onerous standard for waste 
is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment 
presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be 




Therefore, the Disney case did not amount to waste.
301
 
After the decision was released, commentators said that the Delaware 
Supreme Court had effectively stated that while fiduciary duty, good faith, 
and waste theories apply in executive compensation situations, in the 
majority of cases the court will only make a procedural inquiry into 
compensation determinations as opposed to an actual evaluation of the 
substance of compensation packages.
302
  Basically, as long as proper 
procedures are observed and the directors act in good faith, liability is at 
best a remote possibility.
303
  But these procedural safeguards do little to 
protect shareholders from directors who may use their discretion in favor 
of executives.
304
  There seems to be a common impression that the 
payment to Ovitz of $130 million for fourteen months’ work was 
excessive, but the Delaware Supreme Court’s refusal to conduct a 
substantive rather than procedural inquiry left the shareholders with 
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virtually no opportunity for a remedy.
305
  To potentially make matters 
worse, after cases like this one, corporate boards are encouraged to simply 
follow the procedural steps delineated by the courts to insulate themselves 
from possible liability.  This results in a repeated lack of evaluation of the 
substance, which may mean that future shareholders would be left without 
recourse in cases of excessive executive compensation.
306
 
In the Disney case, the Court pointed out that Ovitz was not a fiduciary 
when he negotiated his contract, and therefore the Court would not apply 
much judicial scrutiny to those negotiations.
307
  This is exactly what 
adopting Corporate 36(b) would change.  Under Corporate 36(b), the 
prospective executive would be considered a fiduciary in matters of pay 
packages, thereby allowing a court to examine not only the procedural 
aspects surrounding compensation but its substantive nature as well.  As I 
have described at length, the substantive examination will in part depend 
on the strength of the procedural steps,
308
 and since the Disney case was 
quite deficient in that area (although not enough to warrant judgment under 
the current standards), a court would look at the substance in such a case 
with skepticism.  This does not necessarily mean that the court would 
come to the opposite conclusion and hold the executive liable,
309
 but at 
least that possibility would exist, and the shareholders would have the 
opportunity to be heard on the substance of the grievance.  As part of a 
fiduciary’s obligation in the negotiation, there would be a requirement that 
the negotiation committee be informed of all pertinent information, 
including any connection that the fiduciary has to those with whom she is 
negotiating and any other information that may undermine the process.
310
  
This obligation would be carried over to outside prospects if Corporate 
36(b) applied to them.  This would give the compensation committee both 
the necessary incentive and relevant information to uphold its duty to the 
shareholders and ensure a reasonable value for the agreed-upon payment 
package. 
In conclusion, as Charles Yablon and other scholars have pointed out, 
“most legal regulation of corporate behavior does not take place in court, 
but in the lawyers’ offices, as corporate lawyers counsel their clients as to 
what they must do to avoid legal ‘problems’ in connection with the actions 
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they want to take.”311  If Corporate 36(b) had been in place at the time of 
the Disney case, the directors likely would have been advised that the 
merits of the package were going to be reviewed and they may have 
developed a more equitable package.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The federal government can and will act in regard to the popular 
opinion that executive compensation is excessive and a contributing factor 
to some of the economic difficulties that the country has endured over the 
last few years.
312
  According to Professor Steven Bainbridge, “No one 
seriously doubts that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause, 
especially as it is interpreted these days, to create a federal law of 
corporations if it chooses.”313  And, as Judge Posner put it: “In the wake of 
the financial crisis there is almost certainly going to be some regulation of 
executive compensation—it has begun in the form of conditions in the 
recent bailouts of insolvent financial firms.   The question is not whether, 
but how best, to limit executive compensation.”314  That leaves this 
unanswered question as to “how.”  Professor Epstein explains that while 
the current situation is not perfect, direct government intervention in the 
area of executive compensation is likely to confuse matters further.
315
  
Additionally, Dean Thomas Cooley of the NYU Stern School of Business 
has said: “Congress has gotten into the business of dictating executive pay 
now, and they shouldn’t be in that business.  What they should be doing is 
turning the light on the committees.”316  
Corporate 36(b) may be the best alternative available.  While the 
establishment of excessive compensation as a possible breach of fiduciary 
duties may not eliminate the problem (in fact, in many executive contracts, 
breaching fiduciary duties is not even listed as grounds for terminating for 
cause
317
) it will achieve many of the goals necessary for a long-term 
solution.  For example, it has been suggested that “[i]t is the perception of 
abuse that will have a much larger effect on businesses than strict 
compliance with economic theory”318 and that “[t]here are few, if any, 
countervailing incentives to encourage directors to oppose unwarranted 
executive compensation.”319  If these two observations are correct, 
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Corporate 36(b) could have a substantial impact.  It will empower “the 
courts to overturn outlier compensation agreements produced by 
illegitimate managerial power [and thereby] will attack a perceived major 
weakness in our corporate governance system.”320  Further, the creation of 
viable legal consequences for some decisions made by compensation 
committees will force these committees to be more conservative
321
 and 
ultimately save the corporations and hence shareholders money.  The 
problem of excessive executive compensation will be even more 
effectively attacked through a statute passed by the legislature rather than 
through a purely court-fashioned remedy.  If courts are involved as part of 
the process, however, this could prove beneficial as it has in similar 
settings in the past.  In close corporations, there has been some indication 
that increased judicial monitoring has led to improved contracting between 




Scholars have indicated that it is often easier to say that courts should 
pay greater attention to the conduct of directors and executives, but they 
have struggled to define what this would mean in practice.
323
  The solution 
that I propose, by contrast, has the following advantages: it has been tested 
for over thirty years in the investment adviser context with minimal 
negative consequences; it was recently upheld in its application by a 
unanimous Supreme Court; it confers the power upon shareholders to bring 
lawsuits; it addresses the wide and growing sense of inequity expressed by 
the popular media and activist groups such as “Occupy Wall Street”; and it 
will likely forestall a general usurpation of compensation decisions by the 
federal government.  Therefore, Corporation 36(b) should be adopted as 
soon as practicable.  
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